Em Adespoton

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  • 297 Comments
Joined 1 year ago
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Cake day: June 4th, 2023

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  • One clarification: carrier towers can still find a phone; GPS is passive; your phone locates itself in relation to the GPS satellites.

    Most phones are also broadcasting WiFi MAC IDs and Bluetooth MACs, plus hardware and capability strings over Bluetooth. And then any apps you’ve got loaded may also be calling home with your location unless you have that disabled and rotate your ad ID regularly.

    [edit] also worth pointing out that even if you turn a smartphone “off” it still pings the local cell towers with its IMEI regularly. Surprised me the first time I witnessed that.




  • It’s about the traffic shape and size; the packets are all encrypted, but unless you’re filling the gaps with random noise, there’s a pattern to the randomness, in terms of packet size and density, and to the shape of the traffic volume over time.

    If you’re streaming video AND torrenting at the same time, that will cover up some of the torrent fingerprints, but not all.

    And if someone has the fingerprint of a torrent from a non-VPN source, they can pretty reliably figure out exactly which torrent you’re connected to. Pretty much nobody goes to that level of analysis for a random person though; they’d have to already have some reason to be watching your network traffic AND find it worthwhile.


  • Torrenting means you’re sending copies of the files to anyone with a magnet link. Great for quickly sharing legitimate software with a wide group. If you’re trying to download stuff you don’t have a license for, torrenting is a bad solution. Better to find a small community where you can just share files directly, peer to peer or on a private server.

    Torrenting has a very obvious digital fingerprint, so even if you’re using a VPN, your ISP knows you’re torrenting. And if your VPN provider gets served with a notice and their country is a member of any international trade agreement, they know who you are and have a responsibility to take action against you.


  • I keep all my traffic encrypted, use my own DNS, and run a VPN so that anytime I’m away from my place, my traffic is tunnelled through my home setup, which includes a piHole.

    If I need more than that to obscure the traffic source, it goes through TOR.

    I also run a few public web services off the same IP, so the traffic coming out of my address has plausible deniability.

    Plus, I use tracker and ad blockers in all my browsers/devices, of course, as well as block JavaScript by default.


  • Generally, it’s best to go by capability, not by policy.

    Any company has to do what the government of its country says. This goes both for the VPN company, AND any exit node country. So you have to always assume that whatever country your exit node is in has full access to the data exiting the VPN there.

    Then there’s the technology being used, the expertise with which it is configured, and finally the policies in place for handling and storing your PII.

    Mullvad has a strong record on all accounts, even as far as just giving a year’s notice that it will stop supporting OpenVPN.

    AirVPN has virtually no track record, fewer details on hardware, configuration, expertise and PII handling, and it’s in the EU, so has to comply with EU laws as well as Italian laws.

    Being in the EU means it has to comply with the GDPR, which does have its benefits. But it also means an EU member state could put a gag order on your account and be monitoring all your data without you ever knowing.

    So it all comes down to who you want your data to be private from and why.

    Personally, I avoid all public VPN services as much as possible, and assume that the only thing they’re really doing is tricking the next service in the hop as to what country I’m connecting from.



  • The problem is, once the middlemen gain power, they’re never gonna give you up. Music producers are a great example of this, as are telecoms companies.

    All the current SaaS stuff is similar; the offerings LOOK similar, but they’re explicitly designed not to be a 1:1 match, so you can’t just take your business elsewhere, just like the mattress companies of old.

    We’re even seeing this play out in the streaming video market, where each player has its own differentiator, moreso than we ever saw with traditional cable TV.

    Standards are great, but middlemen have no incentives to not subvert them.



  • That means the British Indian Ocean Territory will cease to exist, along with the .io domain and countless websites.

    What will happen is that the International Standard for Organization (ISO) will remove the country code “IO.” IANA (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority) which creates and assigns top-level domains, uses this code to determine which top-level country domains should exist. Once ‘IO’ is removed, IANA will start the process of retiring .io, which involves stopping new registrations and the expiration of existing ‘.io domains.‘

    I don’t get this: shouldn’t Mauritius gain ownership of .io? Russia has .su, and it’s been over 30 years since the Soviets existed.

    [edit] also, since there’s .whateveryouwant these days, why not just make .io a non-country TLD? That’s how it’s used anyway.




  • I feel your pain. I have maintainer roles for a few projects where things could be slowed down by a week or more if I didn’t have direct commit access. And I do use that access to make things run faster and smoother, and am able to step in and just get something fixed up and committed while everyone else is asleep. But. For security critical code paths, I’ve come to realize that much like Debian, sometimes slow and secure IS better, even if it doesn’t feel like it in the moment (like when you’re trying to commit and deploy a critical security patch already being exploited in the wild, and NOBODY is around to do the review, or there’s something upstream that needs to be fixed before your job can go out).




  • It’s worth noting that a sizeable number of Tor exit nodes are actually run by the German government. Meaning: they know exactly what’s going through those nodes.

    So all they need to do to unmask a Tor source IP is control the first hop too. They’re in a position where they can narrow searches down to activity they’re actually interested in without significantly decreasing the privacy of other Tor users, and then they can peel back the onion.

    This has been the case since shortly after Tor was created.